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Abstract
International climate change negotiations reached a critical crossroads in 2012. Facing the 
conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol and with no successor regime yet negotiated, nations have been 
compelled to re-engage in substantive and far-ranging discussions. The nation of Korea has 
distinguished itself in this process, in particular by hosting the final ministerial meeting prior to 
this year’s Conference of the Parties in Doha, Qatar. The Korean government’s willingness to 
lead has also been evidenced by Korea’s founding of the Global Green Growth Institute, a 
leading international organization in the area of environmentally responsible economic 
development, and Korea’s successful bid to host the Green Climate Fund secretariat. Korean 
diplomacy has aided in the consensus to extend the Kyoto Protocol and to continue efforts to 
implement a new climate change architecture by 2020.
The importance of Korea’s facilitative role is enhanced because it has already undertaken 
significant domestic and cross-border efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Korean green 
growth policy has raised accountability for emissions, stimulated ‘green investment’, and 
resulted in a domestic emissions trading system to be launched in 2015. In addition, Korea 
exerts particular credibility on the international stage. As a nation transitioning from 
developing to developed status, it can liaise between both sides of the ‘north-south’ economic 
divide. Korea’s role in COP meetings and other international forums should increase in future 
years, as nations work urgently to overcome the political barriers to reaching a compromise that 
can meaningfully mitigate the impacts of climate change.
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I. Introduction and Background
The populations of nations around the globe are feeling the effects of 
climate change. Altered weather patterns, more frequent and severe natural 
disasters, changes to ecosystems, and shifts in agricultural productivity are 
just a few salient examples. An international consensus has emerged that 
cooperative efforts are needed to successfully mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions and avoid the most harmful consequences of climate change. 
However, a gap persists between scientific evidence and diplomatic 
acknowledgement of climate change, on the one hand, and political and 
economic efforts to mitigate and adapt, on the other hand. Individual 
nations have innovated important and insightful policies to promote 
sustainable development and to harmonize economic productivity and 
environmentally responsible reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, the global nature of atmospheric greenhouse gas accumulation 
presents a need for collective action. To avert the diverse causes of the 
climate change collective action problem, international leadership is 
required. As we explain, the Republic of Korea (“Korea”) has played an 
increasingly important leadership role on the public stage of climate change 
negotiations. As critical discussions continue about the future legal and 
political governance of greenhouse gas emissions, Korea must serve as a 
bridge nation. Korea’s economic and social development provides the basis 
for the Korean government to identify common ground amongst nations 
for future compromise and consensus. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the 
“UNFCCC” or the “Convention”)1) and the Kyoto Protocol,2) which was 
agreed upon at the third Conference of Parties (“COP 3”), are the most 
important international treaties to address the shared challenges of climate 
1) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 21, 1994, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107. 
2) Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), entered into force Feb. 
16, 2005. 
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change.3) The UNFCCC, adopted in 1992 and ratified in 1994, was a great 
and early achievement in international environmental diplomacy. The 
UNFCCC represented a global commitment to address climate change. The 
annual negotiation process, initiated by the UNFCCC and continued at the 
COP held each year, has been the driving force that spawned a variety of 
national actions. The existence of this process, and the continuing 
importance it plays as a forum for negotiation over nearly two decades, are 
strong demonstrations to international society that climate change is indeed 
one of the most important issues of our time. The UNFCCC emphasized the 
inter-related challenges of economic development, environmental integrity, 
and social justice. Pursuing a balanced and sustainable vision for equitable 
global prosperity remains a cornerstone challenge for the international 
community.4) 
COP meetings have provided an annual forum for continuing climate 
change negotiations since 1994. While there have been many important 
COP meetings, COP 18, which will be held from November 26, 2012 to 
December 7, 2012 in Doha, Qatar, comes at a particularly significant time. 
The Kyoto Protocol’s first national commitment period concludes at the end 
of 2012. Consensus to ensure a seamless continuation of the Protocol as of 
January 1, 2013, and thus the maintenance of an international instrument 
for climate change governance, is essential. Without action on the Kyoto 
Protocol, the nations of the world will collectively lapse into a “legal gap,” 
with no source of law in force.5) 
In addition, a transition to a future climate change regime requires 
decisive action in 2012. The work on negotiating a new, universal, and 
3) For a brief history of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, see IISD, Summary of the 
Bangkok Climate Talks: 30 August – 5 September 2012, 12 n.555 earth NegotiatioN BulletiN 1-2, 
(2012). See also UNFCCC, Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate 
Change, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php.
4) UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA), FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/INF.3/Rev.1, Report on the workshop on 
equitable access to sustainable development (Aug. 15, 2012); CAN, Fair Effort Sharing Discussion 
Paper (Jul. 12, 2011); CAN, CAN Fair Effort Sharing Principles Position Paper (Sept. 22, 2011).
5) Daniel Bodansky, W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond, Harvard Project on 
Climate Agreement 3-11 (Aug. 2011); Jacob Werksman, Law and Disorder: Will the Issue of Legal 
Character Make or Break a Global Deal on Climate?, German Marshall Fund of the United States 
Policy Brief 3 (Jul. 2010).
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legally binding climate agreement by 2015, which is to enter into force from 
2020 and aspirationally will be applicable to all nations (encompassing both 
developed countries and developing countries), started in 2012. At prior 
ministerial meetings, national representatives have confirmed their 
understanding that interim measures to mitigate climate change harms 
must be put into place as soon as possible. The timeline for negotiating the 
legal instrument to govern the post-2020 period must be accelerated and 
urgent, as delays may compromise the ability to put such an instrument in 
place in the years remaining before 2020.
At previous COPs, it was possible for the nations of the world to delay 
agreement on a concrete system for climate change governance moving 
forward, because the Kyoto Protocol provided a backstop. Now, COP 18 
must result in a specific resolution on the climate change law to apply 
starting in 2013. It is neither hyperbole nor unsupported contention to state 
what national delegates have explicitly and implicitly agreed upon in prior 
ministerial meetings: we have run out of time for postponing difficult but 
necessary international decisions. 
Korea hosted the 2012 Pre-COP Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change 
(“Pre-COP 18”) from October 21-23 in Seoul, under the banner “Meet the 
Challenge, Make the Change-Moving Forward with a Balanced Perspective.”6) 
This Pre-COP marked a critical moment for the future of international 
climate change law and policy. It was a result of a compromise at COP 17 in 
Durban, at which time Qatar and Korea were both candidates to host COP 
18. It was agreed that Qatar would host the COP, whereas Korea would 
host a key transitional meeting to help ministers prepare for the COP. 
Under this spirit of cooperation, the upcoming COP 18 President served as 
co-chair with the Korean Minister of Environment at Pre-COP 18. 
As the last Ministerial Meeting before COP 18, Pre-COP 18 provided a 
conducive forum for positive and constructive discussions. Forty-seven 
Ministers from all regions engaged candidly with each other on the political 
6) Hwangyeongbu [Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Korea], Seoul Gihubyeon-
hwajanggwangeupoeui, Dohaui Seonggongeul Ryeyakhada [Pre-COP Ministerial Meeting on Climate 
Change in Seoul Promised 2012 Doha’s Success] (in Korean) (Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://
www.me.go.kr/web/286/me/common/board/detail.do?boardId=notice_02&decorator=me
&idx=183099.
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obstacles to agreement and other issues. Their objective was to advance a 
productive discussion on a new climate regime, in order to ensure that the 
parties in Doha can reach consensus on a plan that will be as concrete and 
specific as possible. Although not a formal negotiation session, the Seoul 
Pre-COP was expected to deliver a meaningful outcome.
The two co-chairs called on all Ministers to provide leadership and 
political will to move the negotiations in a direction that would enable COP 
18 to reach important decisions to help define the path forward. As a result, 
a set of key Doha deliverables was identified: (i) the adoption of the 
Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol on the second commitment period, 
with an understanding that a second commitment period would apply 
immediately to a range of countries in order to avoid a legal gap; (ii) 
conclusion of the work under the AWG-LCA (Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention); and (iii) political 
momentum to the ADP to continue its work, with the assurance that it 
would meet its 2015 deadline.7)
Korea has been increasingly vocal and visible in recent environmental 
negotiations. At the inter-sessional meetings to prepare for the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (the “Rio+20 Summit”), 
Korea served as a co-chair nation and was charged with the task of building 
compromise among negotiating parties. At the Rio+20 Summit, the Korea-
initiated Global Green Growth Institute (“GGGI”) was successfully 
transformed into an international organization through the participation of 
several countries.8) From the Korean government’s point of view, hosting 
the Pre-COP was a test case in asserting the nation’s emerging role as a 
crucial player to bridge gaps between developing and developed countries 
in the context of climate change negotiations.
Unsurprisingly, it proved very difficult to bring about any specific 
breakthroughs in the Pre-COP 18 climate change negotiations. First, as an 
7) Co-Chairs’ Reflections, 2012 Pre-COP Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Seoul 
(Oct. 22-23, 2012), at 5, available at http://www.me.go.kr/web/286/me/common/board/
detail.do?boardId=notice_02&decorator=me&idx=183099.
8) Global Green Growth Institute, GGGI Holds Signing Ceremony to Convert into 
International Organization at Rio+20 (Jun. 20, 2012), available at http://www.gggi.org/news/
release/2011/00/00/gggi-holds-signing-ceremony-convert-international-organization-
rio20-0.
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informal ministerial meeting, it was not intended to be a forum for formal 
negotiations, so any progress made is inherently informal and difficult to 
measure. Further, this meeting was held only one and a half months after 
the conclusion of a negotiation session in Bangkok,9) so participants were 
not in a position to move dramatically from their recently established 
positions. Lastly, the duration of the meeting was too short for ministers to 
lay out new perspectives in sufficient detail to reveal previously unidentified 
opportunities for consensus.  
In light of all these considerations, several important implications can be 
drawn, particularly for Korea. First and foremost, by collaborating with 
Qatar to achieve continuity between Pre-COP 18 and COP 18, Korea has 
demonstrated that it is functioning in a facilitative role in international 
climate change negotiations. As we will describe later, Korea has made 
several significant achievements in environmental diplomacy, and the 
successful conclusion of the Pre-COP was a culmination of those 
achievements. Korean diplomatic efforts have constructed an infrastructure 
to publicize green growth policy (or in climate change terms, Low Emission 
Development Strategies or “LEDS”). Green growth is an action-oriented 
paradigm that promotes a mutually supportive relationship between 
growth and the environment by holistically embracing the framework of 
sustainable growth.10) The green growth policy scheme needs to be 
re-examined and refined in order to provide a governing “software.” 
However, green growth continues to hold the promise of producing 
reliable, objective guiding principles for international policy.11) As the 
nations of the world embark upon climate change negotiations with 
increasing urgency, Korea can and should advance the concrete premises 
and tangible outcomes of green growth as source material for public 
international law.
9) For summary report of the Bangkok climate talks, see Earth Negotiation Bulletin (Sept. 
8, 2012), available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12555e.html.
10) Jisoon Lee, greeN groWth: KoreaN iNitiatives for greeN CivilizatioN (2010).
11) See World Bank, Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development (2012); 
OECD, Fostering Innovation for Green Growth (2011).
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II. Challenges Faced at the Pre-COP
1.  Bridging the gap between developed countries and developing countries
One of the most significant obstacles to the implementation of 
internationally agreed upon climate change mitigation measures is the 
difference of positions between developed and developing nations.12) 
Divergent economic interests, historically rooted disagreements on cultural 
and social issues, and conflicting visions for the future of diplomatic 
relations all contribute to this positional gap. The international community 
must address the lack of trust in negotiations and the need for balance in 
designing a durable compromise. Appropriate balances need to be struck 
between the efforts of developed countries and developing countries for 
moving climate action forward. To do so, it is clear that greater trust, and 
thereby greater capacity for collective action, must be built between 
developed countries and developing countries.13)
On the issue of mitigation actions, developing countries claim that 
developed countries need to reduce their emissions much more quickly and 
substantially, due to their historic responsibility for emissions and their 
greater capacity to undertake mitigation while maintaining a high quality 
of life for their citizens. Developing nations further argue that developed 
nations should provide financial and resource support to the developing 
world to facilitate mitigation and adaptation actions.14) Developed countries 
12) Michael W. Howard, Sharing the Burdens of Climate Change: Environmental Justice and 
Qualified Cosmopolitanism, in Paul G. Harris (ed.), Ethics and Global Environmental Policy 110-
20 (2011); Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Equity in Climate Change, 5383 World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 1-2 (2010); Jonathan Pickering, Steve Vanderheiden & Seumas 
Miller, Ethical Issues in the United Nations Climate Negotiations: A Preliminary Analysis of Parties’ 
Positions, available at http://www.cappe.edu.au.
13) Bradley C. Parks & J. Timmons Roberts, Inequality and the Global Climate Regime, in 
Paul G. Harris (ed.), the PolitiCs of Climate ChaNge: eNviroNmeNtal dyNamiCs iN iNterNatioNal 
affairs 184-87 (2009).
14) UNFCCC, Art. 4(7) (“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention 
related to financial resources and transfer of technology …”); Kyoto Protocol, Art. 11.
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insist that developing countries must demonstrate that they are sincere 
about their participation in global nitigation efforts. According to this view, 
developing nations must make emissions mitigation pledges of their own, 
register their mitigation actions, and document the support they require in 
order to accomplish the collective action necessary to limit the probable 
increase in global temperature (relative to pre-industrial levels) to below 
2°C.15) In Durban, the result of this debate was that governments implicitly 
rejected the pre-existing firewall between Annex I and non-Annex I 
nations.16) The principle of near-universal inclusion of nations in a collective 
climate change scheme has gained support, but many variables remain 
regarding the form and amount of support to developing countries, the 
nature and enforcement of commitments, and the inter-dependent 
relationship between developed and developing nations going forward. 
On the issue of finance and the termination of work under the AWG-
LCA, developing countries maintain that the finance discussion should 
continue under the AWG-LCA, referring to decisions from Bali,17) 
Copenhagen18) and Cancun.19) Developed countries maintain that the AWG-
LCA has already achieved significant results and other subsidiary bodies 
such as the SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice) and the SBI (Subsidiary Body for Implementation) can provide the 
15) UNFCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011), para.4.
16) UNFCCC, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (2011), available at unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php; Lavanya Rajamani, The 
Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of International Environmental Law, 8 
iNterNatioNal affairs 616-18 (2012); Wolfgang Sterk, Christof Arens, Florian Mersmann, 
Hanna Wang-Helmreich & Timon Wehnert, On the Road Again: Progressive Countries Score a 
Realpolitik Victory in Durban While the Real Climate Continues to Heat Up, Wuppertal Institute for 
Climate, Environment and Energy 33 (2011).
17) Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, paras. 1(b)(ii) & 1(e), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.
18) Copenhagen Accord, paras. 5 & 8, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/
cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
19) Cancun Agreement, Decision 1/CP.16, §III(B) (“Recognizing that developing country 
Parties are already contributing and will continue to contribute to a global mitigation effort in 
accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention, and could enhance their 
mitigation actions, depending on the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building 
support provided by developed county Parties”), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2.
 The Road to Doha through Seoul   |  63No. 1: 2012
most productive forums in which to continue the finance discussion.20)  
How can we ensure that governments undertake environmentally 
efficient and credible commitments when there is prevalent mistrust 
between developed and developing countries? Increasing ambition has 
many dimensions. Nations must demonstrate the ambition not only to 
deepen pledges but also to employ diverse instruments to catalyze the 
fulfillment of those pledges, and to engage various public and private 
actors in the process. In other words, clarifying the means of implementation 
will be a critical building block for the system of enhanced action under the 
Convention.
2. Proposing a viable development strategy to enhance mitigation action 
Climate change implicates virtually every area of domestic policy. As a 
result, the climate change regime raises much greater domestic sensitivities 
than other international regimes. On the other hand, given the international 
approach of setting caps and allowing nations flexibility in achieving their 
designated target levels, individual governments can rationally adopt 
policies to respond to unique problems they are facing and to emphasize 
domestic priorities in domestic mitigation actions. In order to establish trust 
building in the system, the system must incentivize what governments can 
do best, instead of focusing entirely on areas or mechanisms where they are 
unlikely to commit.21) The system must be flexible enough to accommodate 
many different national approaches.
As nations seek to address the challenge of acting individually and 
collectively to formulate responsible climate change policies while 
promoting sustainable economic development, it is critical for all the 
participants in climate change negotiations to promote innovative national 
policies; these policies are commonly referred to as Low Emission 
Development Strategies (“LEDS”) or Low Carbon Development Strategies 
(“LCDS”). Such strategies reflect national circumstances and specific 
challenges, while harnessing public and private opportunities for seeking 
20) IISD, supra note 3, at 10.
21) See generally David G. Victor, gloBal WarmiNg gridloCK: CreatiNg more effeCtive 
strategies for ProteCtiNg the PlaNet (2011).
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compatibility and efficiency in economic, social, and environmental 
policies. 
While international negotiation on the future regime is underway, 
equally important will be the process to actually implement the 
international commitments that result from this negotiation. Once the 
parties reach agreements on structure and governance, proactive steps 
must be taken to expeditiously realize the vision of sustainable 
development and green economy. These efforts should operate on multiple 
levels and engage multiple stakeholders. LCDS will significantly 
complement international efforts to address climate change.
LEDS and LCDS were prominently featured in the text of the 2009 
Copenhagen Accord,22) the 2010 Cancun Agreement23) and the 2011 Durban 
Platform.24) LCDS can play a pivotal role as a strategy and means of policy 
coordination; LCDS can be a pathway to effective climate change responses, 
including mitigation and adaptation. Moreover, LCDS should enable 
nations to articulate Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(“NAMAs”), meaningful steps that can be recognized by the UNFCCC.25) 
Enabled through appropriate financial and technical support from 
developed countries, developing countries can implement long-term LCDS 
as part of their overall development planning. These strategies should be 
determined through a bottom-up, country-driven process. As part of this 
process, developing countries should identify NAMAs they would 
undertake unilaterally.26)
22) Decision 2/CP.15, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, para. 2. 
23) Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at 14 & paras. 6, 45 & 65.
24) Decision 2/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, at 9, 27 & paras. 11, 28, 135 & 168; 
Decision 3/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, paras. 2, 36 & 40.
25) See World Resources Institute, The International Partnership on Mitigation and 
Measurement Reporting and Verification: Lessons and Next Steps (Nov. 2011). The parties at COP 
17 decided to design the Registry, which will include information on NAMAs (those seeking 
international support as well as other individual NAMAs). Draft decision [-/CP.17], Outcome 
of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, paras. 45-55 (Advance unedited version). Implementing the decisions of COP 16 
in Cancun, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was 
requested in Durban to develop general guidelines for domestic measuring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) of unilateral NAMAs. Ibid., paras. 34 & 37.  
26) The COP 17 decision reaffirmed “that social and economic development and poverty 
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Indeed, the Durban Platform aims at developing “a protocol, another 
legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force”27) for the post-2020 
period, and the question has been raised about the legal nature of the 
outcome. Could the requirement of “legal force” be satisfied by 
commitments that are legally binding under a country’s domestic law, 
rather than under international law? Would this be consistent with the 
language in the preamble of the Durban Platform about the need to 
strengthen “the multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention”? If 
domestic policy coordination is one way forward, this policy coordination 
may not be “legally binding under the international law,” but can 
nevertheless be “domestically binding” or carry some “legal force.”28) The 
Durban agreement stipulates negotiation of a new legally binding 
agreement but nowhere states that this agreement is to include legally 
binding emission reduction commitments, so this question is still 
completely open. This ambiguity provides flexibility for individual Parties, 
which means that developing countries would submit LCDS plans and 
NAMAs.
III. Korea’s Challenges and Opportunities at COP 18
Based on the political guidance resulting from Pre-COP 18, the parties at 
COP 18 are intended to adopt the workplans necessary to negotiate a global 
eradication are first and overriding priorities of developing country Parties, and that a low-
emission development strategy is central to sustainable development, and that the share of 
global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and 
development needs” and that developed countries “shall provide enhanced financial, 
technology and capacity-building support for the preparation and implementation of NAMAs 
of developing country Parties.” Ibid., at 6.   
27) Decision 1/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, para. 2.
28) Raj Bavishi, Unwrapping the Durban Package (March 2012), pp. 7-11, available at http://
www.legalresponseinitiative.org/download/BP40E%20-%20Briefing%20Paper%20-%20
Unwrapping%20the%20Durban%20Package%20(12%20March%202012).pdf; Jacob 
Werksman, Q & A: The Legal Aspects of the Durban Platform Text (Dec. 2011), available at http://
insights.wri.org/news/2011/12/qa-legal-aspects-durban-platform-text; Lavany Rajamani, 
Decoding the Durban Platform (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/decoding-
the-durban-platform/.
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climate change agreement to be adopted by 2015 and to take effect from 
2020; at COP 18, the parties should proceed to outline the main principles 
for this new universal agreement.29) We will outline and analyze Korea’s 
challenges and opportunities in future negotiations.
1. Constructing the specific index of national circumstances for Korea
During the 18 years of COP conferences, it has been difficult to classify 
Korea as simply “developing” or “developed.” Korea was not categorized 
as an Annex I nation under the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, as were traditionally 
wealthy countries. Excluded from this category, Korea was not under an 
obligation to reduce its carbon emissions. Since COP 3, the Korean economy 
has continued to grow30) and has strengthened relative to many other 
nations, and Korea now has a higher per capita GDP than approximately 
half of the Annex I nations.31) Furthermore, recent negotiations reflect a 
stakeholder approach to emissions mitigation that would entail much 
broader, even universal national participation and commitments, consistent 
with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” Given 
these considerations, Korea will most likely be regarded as a developed 
country for the purposes of a future legal regime,32) and will certainly be 
29) CAN, Doha Milestones and Action 7-10 (Aug. 2012); CAN, Increasing Mitigation Ambition 
in Doha 3-4 (Aug. 2012).
30) As of 2010, Korea is the seventh largest carbon emitting country, according to an 
estimate by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/environment/datablog/2012/jun/21/world-carbon-emissions-league-table-country. 
For a comparison of per capita emission levels, see Jyoti Parikh & Litul Baruah, A New 
Framework for the UNFCCC, 47, no. 45 eCoNomiC & PolitiCal WeeKly 67 (Nov. 10, 2012).
31) Korea’s per capita GDP is approximately $31,200, according to a recent estimate 
provided by the United States Central Intelligence Agency; this is higher than twenty Annex I 
nations, including New Zealand, Spain, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Turkey, to name a few. 
CIA World Factbook, ISSN 1553-8133, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.
32) Only 15 countries are responsible for more than 80 per cent of global emissions, and 
Korea is one of them. Jasmin Hundorf, Institutionalizing and Agreement among Main Emitters 
under the Umbrella of the UNFCCC, presented at Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Study 
Network on Integration and Trade 42-56 (2012). Agreement among the 15 largest emitters to 
reduce their GHG emissions is a crucial immediate step to mitigate the effects of climate 
change. Ibid., 37-43; Victor, supra note 21, at 250; Arunabha Ghosh & Ngaire Woods, Governing 
Climate Change: Lessons from Other Governance Regimes, in Dieter Heml & Cameron Hepburn 
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expected to assume binding commitments that incrementally contribute to 
the global effort to mitigate carbon emissions.
Korea’s domestic policies and intensifying participation in international 
negotiations indicate that it is emerging as a leader in this area. Recently 
developed and increasingly prosperous nations like Korea should not 
assume a passive position of favoring the status quo and assuming 
obligations only to the minimum extent necessary for the formation of a 
global climate change system. In order for negotiations to succeed in the 
first place, nations at differing stages of economic development must 
actively lead. Significant net global emissions reductions are necessary for 
societies to avert the worst consequences of climate change. 
We expect that Korea will build upon its own willingness to make 
commitments and undertake international obligations of the magnitude 
necessary to proportionally contribute to an effective global mitigation 
strategy, because it has already demonstrated the seriousness of the 
nation’s resolve. Korea has made voluntary emission reduction pledges as a 
non-Annex I country.33) In fact, Korea’s pledge to cut emissions is the largest 
among non-Annex I countries.34) Korea is also committed to the sustained 
use of incentives-based regulatory instruments as an integrated dimension 
of domestic policy to harmonize carbon emissions-reduction and 
sustainable development.35) Korea’s recently legislated cap-and-trade 
system is a prominent example of the progress already made to implement 
incentive instruments.36) Korea’s pledge is credible because the statement of 
political will was quickly followed by legal action.
(eds.), the eCoNomiCs aNd PolitiCs of Climate ChaNge 477 (2009).
33) Korea has made a voluntary commitment to reduce its nationwide carbon emissions 
by 30% below business-as-usual levels by 2020. Shinhye Kang, South Korea to Cut Greenhouse 
Emission 30% by 2020 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pi
d=newsarchive&sid=aTCt6NfyRFDo.
34) Korea’s goal is set at the highest level recommended for emerging economies by the 
IPCC.
35) Prominent among these legislations is the Low Carbon Green Growth Framework 
Act. See generally John M. Leitner, The Expansive Canopy of Korean Green Growth: Key Aspects for 
Forest Conservation Projects in Southeast Asia, 10 J. Kor. l. 171 (2011).
36) For a detailed discussion of the Emission Trading System in Korea, see Hongsik Cho, 
Legal Issues Regarding the Legislation for an Emission Trading System in Korea, 9 J. Kor. l. 161 
(2009).
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The launching of the Durban Platform will not necessarily result in an 
agreement under which all countries will have legally binding 
commitments.37) However, it is very likely that Korea will be amongst the 
increasing number of countries to undertake binding emission reduction 
commitments in the post-2020 climate change regime. COP 18 discussions 
will include preliminary talks on how to address differing national 
circumstances in shaping the agreement; this, in turn, will have a significant 
impact on Korea’s carbon-intensive industry sectors. While Korea’s ability 
to assume emissions reductions may not be as great as the wealthiest 
nations, Korea can model for emerging economies the capacity to 
undertake meaningful and credible commitments, and to harmonize those 
commitments with a robust and efficiently regulated economic growth 
trajectory. In this context, an index of the national circumstances for Korea 
and other nations must be developed, taking into account industrial 
structure and capacity for further mitigation actions.38) These indexes can be 
defined as country-specific circumstances resulting in variances of sector 
emissions among countries that are virtually impossible to influence by the 
governments concerned, at least in the short and medium run. Hence, 
under certain conditions, such indexes may provide grounds for justification 
and agreement at the international negotiation table to concede certain 
additional allowances to the national emission mitigation targets of 
countries that are faced with less favorable country-specific circumstances.
From the perspective of Korea, key variables for these indexes include 
the contribution of energy-intensive industry to GDP and the level of 
energy efficiency. Korea is facing specific problematic circumstances 
because its economy is in a state of transition from a rapidly developing, 
industrializing state to a more developed and moderately growing services 
economy. These circumstances may justify temporary, additional quantities 
of permitted emissions during the transition period.
In addition, given a certain economic structure, the level of energy 
efficiency determines the energy savings potential and the emissions 
37) Wolfgang Sterk et al., supra note 16, at 32.
38) In Bangkok, Korea supported incentives for developing country participation that 
take into account national circumstances, such as population growth rate and density, energy 
mix, renewable energy endowment, and the extent of coastline. IISD, supra note 3, at 4.
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reduction potential. Considerable differences exist in the energy efficiency 
of countries, varying by sector. As a result, the potential for reducing CO2 
emissions by improving energy efficiency will differ from country to 
country.39) Applying equal emissions limitations to all countries would 
disadvantage countries that have already invested great effort and 
resources into achieving energy efficiency.40) Competitiveness considerations 
and the related fear of foreign relocation of carbon-intensive industries 
have led many nations to advocate the use of energy efficiency improvement 
potentials as a basis for setting mitigation targets.41) 
2.  Balancing the principle of efficiency and the principle of equity when 
designing the structure of financial, technology and capacity-building 
support  
The need for financial, technology and capacity-building support in 
developing countries is broadly acknowledged as a key issue to address 
climate change. Debates about climate finance are based on the seemingly 
conflicting principles of efficiency and equity. For example, international 
discussions frequently take under consideration the scale of funding 
needed and alternative ways of generating these sums. Familiar divergence 
between the principle of efficiency and the principle of equity is evident on 
this question. The former principle tends to emphasize the use of market 
mechanisms to stimulate investments in cleaner technologies that can 
reduce GHG emissions or more efficiently sequester the gases generated in 
39) See Australia’s Department of Climate Change, Australia’s Fifth National Communication 
on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(2010); Danish Ministry of Environment, Denmark’s Fourth National Communication on Climate 
Change: Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2005); Singapore’s 
National Climate Change Secretariat, Climate Change & Singapore: Challenges, Opportunities, 
Partnerships (2012); United States Department of State, US Climate Action Report 2010, 
Washington: Global Publishing Services (Jun. 2010).
40) See Finnish Ministry of Environment, Finland’s National Report under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1995); Italian Ministry of Environment, First Italian 
National Communication to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1995).
41) The Third Session of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, Geneva, Mar. 5-8, 
1996, Report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate on the Work of its 3rd Session, Held at 
Geneva from 5 to 8 March 1996, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBM/1996/5( Apr. 23, 1996).
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various sectors of the economy. The latter tends to focus on securing legal 
commitments under the UNFCCC, requiring that much of the climate 
change funding come through a predictable transfer of resources from rich 
to poor countries via public financing channels. The challenge is not 
necessarily to choose one or the other source, but rather to determine how 
funds raised through multiple sources can contribute to the international 
regime. Thus, the issue faced by Korea is on the one hand, how to leverage 
public funds to support viable conduits for greater sums of private 
investment and, on the other hand, how to give voice to developing 
countries in allocating funds and monitoring fund flows. 
The principle of equity is a cornerstone principle of the Convention and 
the Protocol. It must remain a central focus for our continuing efforts. 
Equity must be agreed upon and ensured through all the facets of 
international climate change discussions, including national commitments 
and mitigation, finance, and knowledge sharing and transfer, to name a few 
areas. The central importance of the principle of equity reflects both the 
ideal of a socially just climate change system and the reality that, where 
global action is needed, any successful system must be sustainable through 
time. Developing nations, including some of the largest individual 
contributors to current greenhouse gas emissions, must engage with the 
international system and must credibly comply with emissions targets. 
Only a system understood to be fair and in the common interest of all (or 
nearly all) nations can command respect and adherence as political and 
social forces shift in various nations. 
For instance, as Korea prepares for a presidential election at the end of 
2012, the continued vitality of Korean green growth and the many laws and 
regulations promulgated thereunder depends upon the social perception of 
green growth as well-conceived and responsibly administrated. To long 
endure, green growth must occupy the robust position of a fundamental 
pillar of Korean law. Such a fundamental area of law will certainly be 
subject to evolving interpretation and application as political elections 
ensue, technology advances, and social conditions change. However, just as 
a respected domestic legal system co-evolves with the society, so too must a 
socially equitable climate change system maintain its force and authority 
through time and amongst nations. It should be noted that specific projects 
undertaken in Korea as part of the green growth policy have been subject to 
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criticism. One of the most ambitious and expensive public investments, the 
“Four Rivers Restoration Project,”42) met considerable resistance in Korean 
society.43) Opponents in many cases argued that the project was not in fact 
compatible with the environmental and energy-efficiency values of green 
growth.44) As Korea continues to aggressively pursue green growth policies, 
and to take a leadership position in the world community, it is essential 
that the Korean government be receptive to internal and external criticisms. 
Through government transparency and robust debate about policies, green 
growth becomes more likely to achieve environmental and economic 
benefits, and more fully embodies the social and political legitimacy needed 
for the policy to adapt and endure.
One reason why Korea can be expected to continue to exert an important 
influence in international negotiations is that the nation has a comprehensive 
and broadly supported domestic strategy for pursuing the parallel 
objectives of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Korea’s situation 
exemplifies the potential for enactment of major domestic legislation and 
the implementation of robust executive enforcement of climate change 
regulations. This stability in domestic law and policy has enabled the 
Korean government to more aggressively engage with diverse dimensions 
of global climate change negotiations, and Korea now participates on a 
foundational level in the finance, strategy, and technology aspects of 
international discussions. Concurrently with Pre-COP 18, Korea hosted the 
Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund (“GCF”).45) GGGI has, as of October 
42) The stated purpose of the Four Rivers Restoration Project is to restore the Han, 
Nakdong, Geum and Yeongsan Rivers and to provide water security, flood control and 
ecosystem vitality; however, many environmental groups criticized this massive civil 
engineering scheme for pursuing environmentally suspect economic objectives under the 
guise of green development. Dennis Normille, Restoration or Devastation?, 327 sCieNCe 1568, 
1568-70 (2010). 
43) Sun-Jin Yun and Dong-Ha Lee, Agenda Setting and Frame of TV News about 4 Rivers 
Project in Korea (in Korean), 14 eCo 7 (2010).
44) Id. See also South Korea’s Four Rivers project: The dredgery must go on, the eCoNomist, 
Aug. 9, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/08/south_koreas_
four_rivers_project; Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea announces opposition to Four Rivers 
project, the haNKyoreh, Mar. 13, 2010, available at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_
edition/e_national/409868.html.
45) In retrospect, Korea would likely not be the host the GCF Secretariat if it had hosted 
COP 18 in Seoul. In the context of international environmental diplomacy, an application by 
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18, 2012, been converted into an international organization. GGGI’s 
fieldwork in various nations has thrust it into the forefront of transnational 
efforts to implement impactful and balanced climate change policies. 
Accomplishing international synergies needed to expediently mitigate 
carbon emissions, especially in a manner compatible with continued 
economic growth, requires significant sharing and continual improvement 
of technology. To this end, Korea has instituted the Green Technology 
Center-Korea to promote the innovation of technology related to energy 
and environment and to facilitate transfer of essential knowledge to 
developing states. 
The “green triangle” of finance, strategy, and technology captures the 
essential aspects of an effective and pragmatic international approach to 
climate change.46) These areas dovetail with the priorities of the UNFCCC 
system, and exemplify the important role Korea must play in the global 
transition from aspirations to effectuated policies. It is likely that Korea will 
be able to contribute to finding consensus on the framework of financial, 
technology and capacity building support at COP 18 in Doha, considering 
that Korea has been strongly committed to green growth leadership in 
general, and to tangible progress in these areas in particular.
To help developing nations reach their 2020 targets, and to ensure they 
can participate in more aggressive and ambitious carbon mitigations from 
2020-2050, further and significant pledges to the GCF must be obtained. To 
secure funding, nations should share the costs by making pledges 
simultaneously to each other, as part of the outcomes of an international 
convention, such as the Doha COP. Korea has already taken a leading role 
in raising funds, and its continued efforts in this area are essential to 
bridging the gap between developed and developing nations, and 
the current COP host country to also host the GCF Secretariat may have been considered 
inappropriate, and almost surely would not have succeeded.
46) Gihoekjaejeongbu [Ministry of Strategy and Finance of the Republic of Korea], 
Noksaekgihugigeum Isahoe, Hangugeul Yuchigugeu-ro Seonjeong [Briefing & Press Release: South 




icDate=2012-10-22&hdnPage=1&skey=policy; Sarah B. Pralle, “Agenda-setting and climate 
change,” in Hugh Compston (ed.), Climate ChaNge aNd PolitiCal strategy 123 (2010).
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embodying the principle of equity in the climate change system. For this 
reason, Korea is expected to play a crucial role at Doha, in order to finalize 
a detailed roadmap for the funding of the GCF.47)
3. Korea as bridge nation
As Pre-COP host, Korea drew upon its transborder and regional 
experience. Korea has provided leadership amongst Asian nations in 
promoting enhanced legal regimes, capacity-building, and cross-border 
investment in carbon-mitigating projects.48) International cooperation helps 
demonstrate the great potential for collective action to achieve climate 
goals.
Korea can draw upon its experience as a recently developed (and still 
developing) nation. In the last 50 years, Korea has gone from a least-
developed nation to a rapidly developing nation. In terms of financial 
assistance, Korea has transitioned from a recipient of overseas development 
assistance to a contributor within a relatively short period of time. Korea 
understands the developmental needs and equity concerns of less 
developed nations. Korea also understands the importance that developed 
nations place on broad participation and shared but differentiated 
commitments by nations at all phases of economic development.
In the context of climate change negotiations, Korea finds itself situated 
between the developed and developing countries. Although Korea belongs 
47) While long deliberations took place on the need to ramp up commitments in the 
period between 2013 and 2020, the final decision did not include heightened commitments on 
climate finance. See Conference of the Parties Seventeenth Session, Durban, Nov. 28–Dec. 9, 
2011, Green Climate Fund – Report of the Transitional Committee, U.N. Doc. UNFCCC/CP/2011/
L.9 (Dec. 10, 2011), para. 16, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/
l90.pdf; Transitional Committee, Report of the Transitional Committee for the Design of the 
Green Climate Fund to the Seventeenth Session of the Conference of the Parties, TC-4/3, 
available at http://unfccc.int/files/cancun_agreements /green_climate_fund/application/
pdf/tc4-3.pdf; UNDP, taKiNg stoCK of durBaN: revieW of Key outComes aNd the road ahead 
30-31 (Apr. 2012).
48) World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012 90-91 (2012). Korea is one of the 
top four host countries generating more than nine-tenths of all credits. Those four countries 
and their respective percentages are: China (60.45%); India (14.15%); Korea (9.12%); Brazil 
(6.90%). See UNFCCC, “CERs issued by Host Party,” available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/
Statistics/Issuance/CERsIssuedByHostPartyPieChart.html.
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to the OECD, it is a non-Annex I country for the purpose of mitigation 
commitments. It shares values, interests, and norms with other developing 
countries. At the same time, Korea contributes to the climate change 
negotiation in a progressive manner as a founding member of the 
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), which also includes Switzerland and 
Mexico. Unsurprisingly, in many climate change negotiation simulation 
studies, Korea was frequently mentioned as a “threshold country,” which 
can make it a good candidate for conducting “shuttle diplomacy” between 
multiple coalitions.49) Indeed, Korea has pronounced its strong will and 
commitment to play a role as a “bridge country” in various international 
environmental forums.50)
As the host of the second GCF Board Meeting as well as the Pre-COP 18 
Ministerial Meeting, Korea demonstrated its capacity to carry out 
facilitative roles in climate change negotiations. So far, the Germany-led 
Petersberg Climate Dialogue has been instrumental in promoting 
cooperation and setting the political direction for negotiations by providing 
an informal setting for ministers from different countries to exchange frank 
views and perspectives on key issues.51) Building upon the experience of 
hosting the Pre-COP, Korea may wish to continue its leadership role by 
establishing a similar forum. A forum like this can be materialized through 
global participation; or a small group of countries can come together to act 
on climate change, complementing other existing initiatives. There are 
indeed multiple dialog forums and implementation groups that actively 
49) Ariel Macaspac Penetrante, Simulating Climate Change Negotiations: Lessons from 
Modeled Experience, NegotiatioN J. 279, 309 (2012).
50) See, e.g., Proposal of the Republic of Korea on the Rio+20 Outcome Document, at 15, 
available at http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/643ROK.pdf.
51) BMU (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety), “Petersberg Climate Dialogue III” (Jul. 2012), available at http://www.bmu.de/en/
topics/climate-energy/climate/international-climate-policy/petersberg-climate-
dialogue/?type=98; “Press release as of 19.07.2012: Environment Minister Altmaier: Advancing 
global climate protection,” available at http://www.bmu.de/en/bmu/press-and-speeches/
current-press-releases/pm/artikel/environment-minister-altmaier-advancing-global-climate-
protection/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=212; “Press release as of 19.07.2012: Informal meeting of 
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operate parallel to the UNFCCC process,52) and Korea’s actions in this 
avenue could inspire greater engagement by other nations as well.
4. Developing the concept of Korea’s Green Growth
At the Pre-COP, Ministers shared the view that “green economy” is one 
of the central tools to achieve sustainable development. ‘Green Economy’ 
first appeared in the document of the Rio+20 Conference.53) Along with 
LEDS, Green Economy valuably contributes to international negotiations, 
because it provides a framework for integrating environmental and climate 
change goals with economic development in a manner that developing 
nations can support. A persistent challenge for each of these policy 
initiatives, however, remains the difficulty of moving from principles to the 
laws, regulations, and economic and social practices that fulfill the 
ephemeral promise of environmentally sound prosperity.
As the international community grapples with the extension of existing 
instruments and the challenge of designing a successful regime, one general 
lesson is that nations can and should seek to incorporate sustainable 
development into domestic law. An early and foundational legal 
commitment to a policy framework for emissions mitigation and 
contemporaneous economic development is vitally important. The Korean 
experience demonstrates that a central and consolidated legal and societal 
forum for deciding how to harmonize environment, economy, and social 
equity stimulates heightened public awareness and activism. Such 
domestic legal steps can also provide a structure for systematically 
pursuing carbon targets and complying with international commitments. 
Another important benefit, from the standpoint of reinforcing the 
effectiveness of the international governance regime, is that structured 
52) Jennifer Morgan and Lutz Weischer, Two Degrees Clubs: How Small Groups of Countries 
Can Make a Big Difference on Climate Change (Oct. 29, 2012), available at http://insights.wri.org/
news/2012/10/two-degrees-clubs-how-small-groups-countries-can-make-big-difference-
climate-change. 
53) IISD, “Summary of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development: 13-22 June 
2012,” 27 earth NegotiatioNs BulletiN 2-21 (2012); Jane A. Leggett & Nicole T. Carter, Rio+20: 
The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, June 2012,” Crs rePort for CoNgress 
5 (2012).
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domestic legal enactments and enforcement facilitate collection and sharing 
of information with other governments and with international institutions. 
In order to enhance mitigation ambition and to achieve the broader goal of 
limiting the total increase in average global temperature, Ministers at the 
ministerial meetings and at Pre-COP 18 encouraged the parties to share 
their experiences on the formulation of low emission development 
strategies. The path forward must reflect a balanced consideration for 
developmental needs and the urgent imperative to mitigate environmental 
harms. Our collaborative efforts must serve to close the gap between 
mitigation ambition and implementation of the measures necessary to 
fulfill that ambition. LCDS, if well designed and coordinated, will 
significantly contribute to these objectives.
Indeed, Korea has engaged in meaningful steps to realize LCDS. Korea 
has voluntarily committed to reductions in the rate of carbon emissions. 
Through its green growth policies, Korea has fostered investment in 
sustainable sectors of the economy. It has acted aggressively to promote 
energy efficiency, most recently and dramatically with its domestic “cap-
and-trade” legislation.54) At Pre-COP 18, the Korean government suggested 
that, in the discussion of viable economic strategies to enhance mitigation 
action in the reflection paper, ‘green growth’ be discussed. Ultimately, 
‘green economy’ and ‘LEDS’ were presented in the text of the co-chairs’ 
reflections. Although the language of the green growth paradigm is not 
currently being used in the work product of international negotiations, 
there is substantial overlap and interaction between Korean green growth 
and the ‘green economy’ and ‘LEDS’ concepts. Korea remains a leading 
example of a nation that has legislated a cornerstone approach under the 
UNFCCC process into its domestic law, and has built upon that initial step 
with a wide variety of legislative and executive initiatives to fulfill the 
promise of green growth in law and economy.
Domestic experiences like Korean green growth demonstrate the value 
of establishing a knowledge-sharing platform or platforms where domestic 
climate actions can be communicated and where states, IGOs, and NGOs 
54) Hee-Jin Noh, The Importance of Passing Korea’s Carbon Trading Bill and ETS Development, 
KCMI Capital Market Opinion (May 30, 2012).
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can consult and collaborate with each other.55) Pre-COP 18 discussions 
emphasized that nations can strengthen international communication and 
collaboration on ambitious national actions, thus harmonizing and 
potentially linking policies. Knowledge-sharing platforms will be vital to 
ensuring the adequate inclusion of technology, education, facilities, and 
other resources into the set of tools that nations, especially developing 
nations, will depend upon to successfully participate in a global climate 
change mitigation regime.
Korea continues to propose ‘green growth’ as a critical international 
asset. While disagreement remains over preferences between principles for 
future policy, such as ‘green growth’, ‘green economy’, and ‘LCDS’, we 
should focus less on nomenclature than on the substantive elements that 
advocates of each approach propose. In the case of green growth, Korea 
strongly supports the creation of regional and global knowledge-sharing 
platforms for communicating domestic and trans-border climate policies 
and actions.56) These platforms can also function as forums for consulting 
amongst nations and between governments, inter-governmental 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations, with the objective of 
promoting transparency and collaboration. This idea is not just compatible 
with the policy prescriptions of other approaches, but must be an essential 
element of the future regime, no matter what labels are applied to the 
underlying philosophy.
Korean green growth has catalyzed several additional paths for 
promoting UNFCCC goals. Fueled by incentives-based instruments, 
Korean public and private parties have forged innovative partnerships with 
other nations, such as China and Brazil, and continue to collaborate closely 
with many regional neighbors, including Indonesia and Cambodia.57) These 
55) This issue was emphasized in the Pre-COP 18 Keynote Speech of Korean Prime 
Minister Hwang-sik Kim (Oct. 22, 2012). As the Prime Minister described, a central function of 
GGGI is to enable information-sharing. Regional and global capacity-building for mitigation 
and adaptation depends upon the exchange of knowledge and the transfer of technologies, 
making platforms for sharing and dissemination a central focus of GGGI and Pre-COP 18 
discussions. 
56) Proposal of the Republic of Korea on the Rio+20 Outcome Document, at 11-12, 
available at http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/643ROK.pdf.
57) Global Green Growth Institute, Green Growth Planning for Developing and Emerging 
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developments are being made outside of the UNFCCC process through 
bilateral or multilateral means.58) However, they embody the UNFCCC 
objectives and values of seeking efficient and mutually beneficial 
partnerships that produce net reductions in emissions while supporting 
economic development and strong diplomatic ties. Consistent with these 
transnational efforts and experiences, the Korean government is of the view 
that various resources and benefits are available to incentivize developing 
countries to establish domestic LCDS or green growth systems, and to 
participate in domestic and transnational projects. No single or limited set 
of paths or options can or should be designated at this time. Flexible and 
continuous collaboration between nations and the public and private 
sectors is a characteristic of Korean green growth that will remain essential 
not just to Korea’s national approach, but to any enduring and global 
regime.
4. Conclusion
Pre-COP 18 and the contemporaneous activities in Seoul provided a 
forum for Korea to assume a more visible leadership position. Korea’s role 
has assumed a dual character of presenting a vision and specific initiatives 
for legal reform, while also conciliating and seeking compromise amongst 
nations, as a bridge between the developing nations that Korea has been 
associated with throughout its modern history, and the developed nations 
that it has recently joined as the Korean economy continues to emerge. 
Korea’s balanced approach to the strategic, financial, and technological 
needs of the future climate change system provides an important insight for 
negotiations at COP 18 and beyond: nations must follow political ambition 
with effective and concrete action. To that end, Korean green growth serves 
as one model for domestic implementation of climate change-responsive 
policies. Korea’s experience with green growth and the desire of Korean 
institutions to promote related but customized approaches to green growth 
Countries, available at http://www.gggi.org/project/main.
58) Remi Moncel, Paul Joffe, Kevin McCall & Kelly Levin, BuildiNg the Climate ChaNge 
regime 4-5 (2011).
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for other nations can increase transnational capacity for meaningful and 
lasting mitigation of carbon emissions.
Korea’s position is that green growth, in a form related to but potentially 
different from the meaning of the concept in Korean law,59) holds great 
promise for domestic legal reforms, such as: (i) establishment of legal 
frameworks to guide executive action and administrative discretion; (ii) 
sectoral reforms, such as water, waster, energy production and use, and 
agriculture; and (iii) the role of the judiciary in interpreting legal duties and 
rights pertaining to the environment. In the international context, green 
growth can help form a basis for consensus and agreement upon more 
tangible and results-oriented language in negotiated international 
instruments. The critical question for Korea, and for other nations taking a 
growing interest in the Korean approach, is the extent to which the Korean 
experience can be understood to have yielded successful outcomes so far, 
and the shared circumstances and values that would enable other countries, 
and ultimately the world community, to benefit from the adoption of some 
version of green growth.
In this paper, we have proposed a number of criteria that can be applied 
to understand the potential of green growth on the international stage, and 
the related question of Korea’s dynamic and emerging role in international 
climate change negotiations. Korea’s success as a leader in climate change 
negotiations depends upon its ability to help identify an elaborated and 
broadly supported system that reflects the principle of equity. Korea’s 
burgeoning experiences in the tripartite realms of strategy, finance, and 
technology should enable it to provide vital leadership. To achieve 
sustainable progress in climate change mitigation, equity considerations 
must be harmonized with efficiency. To this end, Korea’s green growth 
policy must be both the evidence of the nation’s progress up to now, and 
source material for a vigorous and structured international discussion 
59) Adapting green growth or a similar concept for a new nation is not necessarily simple 
or straightforward. The Korean manifestation of green growth policy reflects structural 
aspects of Korean law and government (such as the centralized government institutions and 
the considerable authority of the executive) and practice (for instance, the customs of the 
judiciary in interpreting the constitution or statutory language). Different instruments may be 
needed to reach the same underlying goals, depending upon the legal, political, economic and 
social conditions of a particular country.
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about vision and implementation as the process moves forward.
5. COP 18: Results and Implications
On Saturday, December 8, nearly 24 hours after the scheduled end of 
COP 18, the parties approved final decision texts for the COP. At Pre-COP 
18 and other ministerial meetings, many nations emphasized the need to 
ensure that a legally binding instrument remained in force after the 
expiration of the Kyoto Protocol commitment period at the end of 2012. By 
these terms, COP 18 succeeded in this main objective by completing a 
second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol through 2020.60) Ten 
nations assumed carbon emissions caps for the period, notably the EU and 
Australia.61) Amongst the participant nations in the first commitment 
period, Japan, Russia, Canada and New Zealand all declined to take on 
new commitments.62)
The Kyoto Protocol’s amendments include the introduction of an 
enhanced ambition mechanism, whereby nations with binding commitments 
are encouraged to submit amendments at future COPs increasing the 
amount of their pledged reductions. However, it is doubtful that these 
nations can go much further in committing to reductions when most of the 
world’s largest emitters, including the U.S., the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China) and Korea, have no mitigation obligations. With the Kyoto 
Protocol providing for only limited emissions reductions, upcoming 
negotiations will assume a heightened importance. Korea engaged with the 
international process in a proactive manner throughout 2012, and visible 
leadership will be needed to reach a more comprehensive agreement in the 
coming years.
In addition to extending the term of application of the Kyoto Protocol, 
60) Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, available at http://
unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/6911.php?priref=600007290.
61) Id. at 6-7.
62) Id.
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COP 18, as expected, concluded the work of the AWG-LCA.63) These 
negotiations, ranging from specific policies to the basic question of whether 
the negotiation track should continue, exposed the persistent divisions of 
opinion and trust between developed and developing nations. The events 
of COP 18 confirm that this “north-south” tension remains a profound 
problem for achieving an inclusive and meaningful compromise. Korea’s 
bridge nation role will assume critical importance if these differences are to 
be reconciled. Korea did not clearly concur with the polarized views of 
either developed or developing nations in the AWG-LCA. As Korea seeks a 
stronger leadership role, one major challenge will be for Korea to advocate 
for concrete positions without alienating any bloc of countries in particular.
Negotiations through the ADP negotiation track will continue to seek an 
agreement, consistent with the Durban Platform, that balances mitigation 
and adaptation strategies for responding to climate change.64) As an interim 
measure, developed countries will likely begin to finance the GCF,65) but the 
encouragement of Korea and other nations will remain critical to keep the 
GCF as a priority item, especially in facilitating projects that can have an 
immediate impact. As work under the ADP continues, any comprehensive 
agreement will surely need to contain significant emissions reduction 
pledges from (nearly) all the major emitter nations. Such an agreement, to 
be viable, must also leverage dramatically scaled-up funding to support 
climate change-related investment in developing countries. Just as climate 
change is one of the great challenges of our present moment, so to will be 
finding common ground and achieving sincere commitment from nations 
of the world with vastly different circumstances, but one common and 
menacing problem.
63) See Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/l14r01.pdf. 
64) See Advancing the Durban Platform, FCC/CP/2012/L.13, available at http://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/l13.pdf.
65) The GCF Board and the Standing Committee will continue work on arrangements for 
the operationalization and funding of the GCF. See Arrangements between the Conference of 
the Parties and the Green Climate Fund, available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php#decisions.

